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INTRODUCTION 
Pinnacle Homes, Inc. ("Pinnacle" hereafter) contracted with Platinum Builders, Inc. 
("Platinum") to roof a house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs, Utah. Platinum's 
employee, Glen Ebmeyer actually performed the work. As he was finishing the project, he 
fell from the roof and fractured his right wrist, elbow, and the heels of both feet. He then 
sought workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. 
The Utah Labor Commission's Administrative Law Judge and Appeals Board ruled 
that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, and that both Platinum and 
Pinnacle are liable for those benefits—Platinum as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer and 
Pinnacle as his "statutory employer" pursuant to § 34A-2-103(7) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
In proceedings before this Court, Pinnacle argues it is not liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's 
benefits because it is not his statutory employer. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and § 34A-2-801(8). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did Pinnacle Homes Inc. satisfy § 34A-2-104(4)(b)'s requirements for 
excluding corporate officers as "employees," so as to preclude Pinnacle from being 
considered a "statutory employer" under § 34A-2-103(7)? 
Standard of review: Pinnacle's argument is two-pronged. First, Pinnacle asserts as 
fact that Pinnacle "provided written notice to its insurance agent" that it was excluding its 
officers as employees. (Pinnacle's brief, page 12.) Second, Pinnacle challenges the Appeals 
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Board's application of § 104(4)(b) to the facts of this case. Specifically, Pinnacle contends "it 
does not make sense" to require Pinnacle to comply with § 104(4)(b) by submitting written 
notice of its intention to exclude corporate officers when those officers were Pinnacle's only 
employees. (Pinnacle's brief, page 13.) Different standards of appellate review apply to each 
prong of Pinnacle's argument. 
A. Issues of fact. The objective actions that Pinnacle took to exclude its officers as 
"employees" are questions of fact. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") requires this Court to uphold the Appeals Board's findings of fact 
if "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record." See Drake 
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah App. 1997). 
B. Application of law. Pinnacle challenges the Appeals Board's application of § 
104(4)(b)'s written notice requirement to the facts of this case. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of 
UAPA authorizes Utah's appellate courts to grant relief from agency actions that erroneously 
interpret or apply the law. This review authority is exercised in conjunction with § 
34A-1-103 of the Utah Labor Commission Act, which grants the Commission ". . . the duty 
and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law 
This Court has previously held that § 34A-1-103 is an explicit grant of discretion to the 
Commission: 
(T)he Industrial Commission (predecessor to the Labor Commission) has been 
granted broad discretion to determine the facts and apply the law. (Citing 
§35-1-16(1), now codified as 34A-1-103) When the Commission "applies 
the law," we review its determination for reasonableness. 
Caporoz v. Industrial Commission, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah App. 1997); see also Osman 
Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 240,242 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, in 
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reviewing the Appeals Board's application of § 104(4) to the facts of this case, this Court will 
uphold the Commission's decision unless it "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality" so as to constitute an abuse of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Osman at 243. 
Preservation of issue for review: Pinnacle raised the foregoing issues in proceedings 
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. (Record at 158.) 
2. Did Pinnacle's relationship with Platinum satisfy § 103(7)'s "supervision or 
control" test, thereby making Pinnacle Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer." 
Standard of review: Whether Pinnacle retained supervision or control over Platinum within 
the meaning of § 103(7) requires application of the statutory test to the facts of this case. As 
already noted in this brief, § 34A-1-103 of the Utah Labor Commission Act grants the 
Commission ". . . full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the 
law in this or any other title or chapter it administers . . . ." The Appeals Board's 
determination will be affirmed if found to be reasonable and rationale. Osman at 243. 
Preservation of issue for review: Pinnacle raised the foregoing issues in proceedings 
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. (Record at 168.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes are § 34A-2-103 and § 34A-2-104 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.) These statutes are set forth 
in Appendix A of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This case arises from Mr. Ebmeyer's claim for benefits under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Specifically, Pinnacle seeks appellate judicial review of 
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a determination by the Utah Labor Commission's Administrative Law Judge and Appeals 
Board that Pinnacle is Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" under § 103(7) of the Act and 
therefore liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits. 
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Ebmeyer filed an initial claim for workers' compensation 
benefits against Platinum Builders on September 19, 2003. (Record at 1.) On June 22, 2004, 
Mr. Ebmeyer amended his claim by adding Pinnacle as an additional respondent. (Record at 
65.) Judge Sessions held a formal evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 30, 2004. 
Platinum failed to appear for the hearing and was defaulted. Mr. Ebmeyer, Pinnacle and the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF")1 participated in the hearing. (Hearing transcript at 5.) 
Judge Sessions then issued his decision awarding benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and holding 
Pinnacle and Platinum jointly and severally liable for those benefits. Judge Sessions found 
Platinum liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer. Pinnacle was held liable as Mr. 
Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" under § 103(7) of the Act. (Appendix B; Record at 143-148.) 
Pinnacle requested Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' decision. (Record at 
151-173.) On August 29, 2006, the Appeals Board affirmed Pinnacle's liability for Mr. 
Ebmeyer's benefits. (Appendix C; Record at 217.) Pinnacle then filed the petition for 
judicial review that is now before this Court. (Record at 223.) 
Statement of Facts: Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of constructing and 
then selling houses. (Hearing transcript at 87, 95.) Three individuals, Brad Liljenquist, James 
1 The Uninsured Employers' Fund is created by § 34A-2-704 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act for the purpose of paying workers' compensation benefits to the injured 
employees of uninsured and insolvent employers. The UEF is funded by an assessment 
against the workers' compensation premiums of all insured employers and the imputed 
premiums of all self-insured employers in Utah. 
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McWhorter and Skip McWhorter, own the corporation and serve as its officers. (Transcript at 
15, 75, 95.) These officers acquire building sites, hire contractors, handle financial matters 
and perform other management duties. (Transcript at 80, 84, 87, 92, 98.) However, all 
construction work on each house is performed entirely by contractors hired by Pinnacle. 
(Transcript at 88, 89.) Pinnacle sometimes inspects the work performed by these contractors. 
The contractors are required to correct any errors or defects in their work. (Transcript at 
pages 40, 43, 53, 92.) 
When Pinnacle was incorporated in October 2002, it was advised by an insurance 
agent that it could exclude its corporate officers from the status of employees for workers' 
compensation purposes. Then, according to the agent, Pinnacle would have no employees 
and would not be obligated to purchase workers' compensation insurance.2 (Transcript at 97.) 
Mr. Liljenquist, Pinnacle's vice president of administration, "told [the agent] that we 
wanted to opt out" of workers' compensation coverage. (Liljenquist's testimony on this point 
is attached as Appendix D; transcript at 97.) Pinnacle filed "applications" and obtained 
liability insurance, but not workers' compensation insurance. (Transcript at 98.) 
During April, 2003, Pinnacle began contracting with Platinum to roof several houses, 
including a house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs, Utah. (Transcript at 78, 82.) 
Mel Beagley, Platinum's owner, advised Pinnacle that Platinum had "opted out" of carrying 
workers' compensation insurance. (Transcript at 76, 79.) Platinum assigned Mr. Ebmeyer, 
who had been employed by Platinum since January 2003, to do the work on the Saratoga 
Springs house. (Transcript at 21, 31.) On August 11, 2003, as Mr. Ebmeyer was completing 
2 Section 34A-2-201 imposes an obligation on all employers to obtain workers' 
compensation coverage by obtaining insurance or qualifying as a self-insurer. 
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the roof, he fell from the roofs ridgeline to the ground. (Transcript at 32.) As a result of this 
fall, he fractured both heels, his right elbow and right wrist. (Record volume 2 at 23.) 
Mr. Ebmeyer filed applications for hearing with the Labor Commission to compel 
Pinnacle and Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. (Record at 1, 
65.) Because neither Pinnacle nor Platinum had workers' compensation insurance coverage, 
the Adjudication Division added the UEF as a respondent to Mr. Ebmeyer's claim. (Record 
at 8.) Judge Sessions held a formal evidentiary hearing on Mr. Ebmeyer's claim. (See 
hearing transcript.) Judge Sessions then awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum 
and Pinnacle jointly and severally liable for those benefits. Specifically, Judge Sessions held 
Pinnacle liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to § 103(7). (Appendix B; 
record at 143-149.) 
Pinnacle filed a motion for Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' decision. In this 
motion for review, Pinnacle raised a number of objections to Judge Sessions' decision, 
including the two issues now before this Court. (Record at 151-173.) The Appeals Board's 
rejected Pinnacle's arguments and concluded that Judge Sessions had properly assessed 
liability for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits against both Platinum and Pinnacle. (Appendix C; record 
at 217-220.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no disagreement as to the fundamental facts of this case. Pinnacle contracted 
with Platinum to roof a "spec" house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs. In 
performing that work, Platinum's employee, Mr. Ebmeyer, fell off the roof and suffered 
compensable injuries. As Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer, Platinum is liable for Mr. 
Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits. However, what is in dispute is whether Pinnacle 
6 
is also liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits as a "statutory employer" under § 34A-2-103(7)(a) 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Section 103(7)(a)'s "statutory employer" provision 
is as follows: 
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done . . . for the 
employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or 
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, the contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor . . . are 
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter 
In applying the plain language of § 103(7) to the facts of this case, Judge Sessions and 
the Appeals Board concluded that Pinnacle was subject to the provisions of § 103(7), and that 
the nature of Pinnacle's relationship with Platinum rendered Pinnacle the "statutory 
employer" of Mr. Ebmeyer. 
Now, in appellate proceedings before this Court, Pinnacle challenges the Appeals 
Board's decisions on two grounds. 
First, Pinnacle points out that the "statutory employer" provision of § 103(7)(a) 
applies only to those entities that are already "employers." Pinnacle argues it cannot be 
considered an "employer" because the company's only potential employees—its three 
corporate officers—were excluded as employees pursuant to §34A-2-104(4) of the Act. 
The flaw with this argument is that Pinnacle failed to comply with § 104(4)'s 
requirements for excluding corporate officers as employees. Strict compliance with § 
104(4)'s exclusion provisions is required. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 
P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1998). In short, because Pinnacle failed to comply with § 104(4), 
Pinnacle remained an "employer" and, as such, remained subject to § 103(7)'s "statutory 
employer" provisions. 
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Pinnacle's second argument is that, even if Pinnacle is generally subject to § 103(7)'s 
"statutory employer" provision, Pinnacle did not "retain supervision or control" over 
Platinum's work and, therefore, does not meet § 103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he power to supervise or control the 
ultimate performance of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor 
retain supervision or control over the subcontractor." Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 
P.2d 427, 432 (Utah 1986.) The record in this case establishes that Pinnacle actually 
exercised the right to inspect and require correction of Platinum's roofing work, thereby 
satisfying § 103(7)'s "supervision or control" test. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: BECAUSE PINNACLE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH § 
104(4)'S REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCLUDING CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AS EMPLOYEES, PINNACLE REMAINED SUBJECT TO 
§ 103(7)'S "STATUTORY EMPLOYER" PROVISIONS. 
In simplest terms, Pinnacle argues it cannot be Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" 
under § 103(7) because that provision applies only to "employers." And, according to 
Pinnacle, it is not an "employer" because it has excluded its only employees—its corporate 
officers—from the status of employees pursuant to § 104(4) of the Act. 
The "statutory employer" provision found in § 103(7) begins with the following 
condition (emphasis added): "If any person who is an employer procures any work to be 
done . . . for the employer by a contractor " Thus, because the plain language of § 103(7) 
limits its application to employers, it is necessary to determine whether Pinnacle is an 
"employer" within the meaning of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
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Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as ". . . each person . . . who 
regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business . . . under any 
contract of hire . . . ." More to the point, § 34A-2-104(4)(c) of the Act explicitly states that 
"[a] director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee . . . until the notice 
described in [§ 104(4)(b)]is given." Thus, under these statutory provisions, Pinnacle's 
corporate officers must be considered Pinnacle's employees until such time as Pinnacle 
complies with § 104(4)(b)'s notice requirement. By logical extension, if the corporate 
officers are Pinnacle's employees, then Pinnacle is an employer. 
Whether Pinnacle complied with § 104(4)(b)'s notice requirement so as to exclude its 
officers as employees requires consideration of 1) what Pinnacle actually did to comply with 
§ 104(4)(b) and 2) the legal effect of Pinnacle's actions. Each of these points is discussed 
below. 
A, The Appeals Board Correctly Found That Pinnacle Did Not Submit The Required 
Written Notice Of Exclusion. 
The Appeals Board found that Pinnacle's officers remained employees because 
Pinnacle did not submit the written notice required by § 104(4)(b). (Appendix C; record at 
218.) In its argument to this Court, Pinnacle contends it did submit the required notice. 
(Pinnacle's brief beginning at 12.) Pinnacle's challenge to the Appeals Board's finding of 
fact should be rejected because substantial evidence supports the Appeals Board's 
determination. 
Pinnacle attempts to show its compliance with § 104(4)(b) by citing testimony of Brad 
Liljenquist, one of Pinnacle's owners and its vice president of administration. (Appendix D; 
transcript at 96, 97.) Pinnacle summarizes Mr. Liljenquist's testimony as establishing that 
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Pinnacle "provided written notification to the insurance agent that it did not have any 
employees and subsequently opted out of workers' compensation coverage." (Pinnacle brief 
at 13.) But that was not Mr. Liljenquist's testimony. Rather, Mr. Liljenquist testified that 
Pinnacle filed some sort of "applications" with Pinnacle's insurance agent and that he "told" 
the agent that Pinnacle had no employees and "wanted to opt out" of workers' compensation 
coverage. 
On its face, Mr. Liljenquist's brief and ambiguous testimony does not establish that 
Pinnacle complied with § 104(4)(b)'s objective requirements for notice. In particular, § 
104(4) requires: 1) a written notice 2) naming the persons to be excluded3) that is served 4) 
on the insurance carrier.3 Mr. Liljenquist's testimony merely indicates that he discussed 
excluding Pinnacle's officers with Pinnacle's insurance agent. Pinnacle's counsel did not ask 
questions to adduce any additional information. (Appendix D; transcript at 96, 97.) 
Furthermore, Pinnacle failed to produce either the original or a copy of the written notice 
required by § 104(4). 
After considering the foregoing evidence, with its ambiguities, gaps and omissions, 
the Appeals Board concluded that Pinnacle had failed to prove it actually submitted written 
notice of its intent to exclude corporate officers. In light of the record that was before the 
Appeals Board, the Board's finding of fact on this point is supported by the evidence and 
should be upheld by this Court. 
3 As the Appeals Board noted in its decision, "[i]n the context of §104(4)(b) specifically and 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this reference to "insurance carrier" must be 
understood as referring to the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, and not 
to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage." (Record at 219; Exhibit C, page 
3.) Pinnacle has not challenged the Appeals Board's conclusion on this point. 
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B. The Appeals Board Correctly Applied § 104(4)(b). 
Pinnacle contends that its efforts to opt out of workers' compensation coverage were 
"enough to comply with Section 104(4) and enough to remove Pinnacle Homes from an 
'employer' status in this case." (Pinnacle brief at 13.) The Commission understands this 
argument as a challenge to the Appeals Board's application of § 104(4) to the facts of this 
case. In order for Pinnacle to prevail on such an argument, this Court must conclude that the 
Appeals Board's application of the statute "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality" so as to constitute an abuse of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Osman v. Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 242. 
Admittedly, the Appeals Board held Pinnacle to strict compliance with § 104(4)(b). 
In doing so, the Appeals Board followed the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Olsen v. 
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998). There, the Supreme Court concluded 
that an earlier version of § 104(4) was unambiguous and should be applied according to its 
plain language. Olsen at 259. 
Pinnacle attempts to distinguish its situation from that in Olsen on the basis that 
Pinnacle has no employees except its officers, while the corporate employer in Olsen had 
other employees who remained subject to workers' compensation coverage. Nothing in the 
Olsen decision supports this version of the facts in Olsen. But more importantly, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Olsen does not turn on such assumed facts. To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court observed that workers' compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of 
employee coverage. The Court then stated: "Allowing exclusion of a director from coverage 
on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the Workers' Compensation Act 
liberally against coverage. This we will not do." Olsen at 260. 
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Pinnacle also argues that a literal application of § 104(4)(b) leads to the unreasonable 
result that a corporation must always obtain worker's compensation insurance, even if the 
corporation's only employees are corporate officers who can then be excluded from coverage. 
Pinnacle's argument implies that such a result could not have been intended by the 
Legislature. However, in 1996, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 135, "Workers' 
Compensation Coverage," (Session Laws 1996, Chapter 190), which added subsection (8) to 
§31A-21-104 of the Utah Insurance Code, as follows: 
Notwithstanding Subsection (1) [requiring an "insurable interest"] an insurer 
. . . may issue a workers' compensation policy to a . . . corporation . . . that 
elects not to include any . . . corporate officer as an employee under the policy 
even if at the time the policy is issued the . . . corporation, . . has no 
employees. 
Section §31A-21-104(8) indicates that the Legislature was aware that corporations 
require workers' compensation coverage even when corporate officers have been excluded as 
employees and the corporation had no other employees. Section 31A-21-104(8), § 104(4) and 
§ 103(7) dovetail to insure that the corporate form of organization is not used to shield 
corporations from their responsibilities to provide coverage and pay benefits under the 
workers' compensation system. 
In summary, the Appeals Board's finding that Pinnacle did not submit the written 
notice required by § 104(4)(b) is supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Board 
application of § 104(4)(4) is consistent with the statute's plain language and appellate 
precedent. This Court should therefore affirm the Appeals Board's determination that 
Pinnacle is an employer within the meaning of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and, as 
such, is subject to §103(7)'s "statutory employer" provision. 
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POINT TWO: PINNACLE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PLATINUM 
SATISFIES § 103(7)'S "SUPERVISION OR CONTROL" 
REQUIREMENT. 
Pinnacle's second argument is that "[t]he Labor Commission erred in finding that 
Pinnacle Homes had any supervision or control over Platinum Builders that warrants a 
finding that Mr. Ebmeyer was Pinnacle Homes' employee." In considering this mixed 
question of law and fact, this Court will uphold the Appeals Board's application of the statute 
unless it "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" so as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Osman v. 
Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 242. 
As material to Pinnacle's argument, § 103(7)(a) provides that "[i]f any . . . employer 
procures any work to be done . . . by a contractor over whose work the employer retains 
supervision or control, . . . all persons employed by the contractor . . . are considered 
employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter . . . ."4 As with all 
statutory provisions, § 103(7) must be applied, if possible, according to its plain language. 
Point One of this brief has already discussed the basis for concluding that Pinnacle is 
an "employer" and, therefore, subject to §103(7). As to the proper understanding and 
application of § 103(7)'s phrase "supervision or control," the Utah Supreme Court's 
discussion in Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432 is controlling: "[T]he term 'supervision or control' 
requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control over the project." The 
Supreme Court also observed that "[t]he power to supervise or control the ultimate 
4 The Commission notes that § 103(7) includes other requirements and also treats other 
individuals as employees of the statutory employer. The Commission has omitted these other 
provisions from § 103(7) in order to clarify the statute's language with respect to Pinnacle's 
"supervision and control" argument. 
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performance of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain 
supervision or control over the subcontractor. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, as long as a 
subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general contractor's business, an inference 
arises that the general contractor has retained supervision or control over the subcontractor . 
. . ." Bennett, Ibid. 
In Bennett, it was a general contractor's status as a statutory employer that was under 
consideration. The Supreme Court therefore discussed § 103(7) in terms of the relationship 
between the general contractor, subcontractor, and the subcontractor's direct employee. In 
the case now before this Court, there is no general contractor. Rather, Pinnacle, the owner of 
the construction project, entered into a direct contractual relationship with Platinum, the 
roofing contractor. But this distinction makes no difference. Section §103(7) looks to the 
relationship between the "employer" (Pinnacle in this case) and the contractor (Platinum). 
Thus, Pinnacle is properly considered the "statutory employer" of Platinum's employees, 
including Mr. Ebmeyer, if Pinnacle retained the power to supervise Platinum's ultimate 
performance as discussed in Bennett. 
There is no dispute that Platinum's business was the construction of homes for sale 
and that the roofing that Platinum did for Pinnacle was a "part or process" of that business. 
Consequently, under Bennett, the inference arises that Pinnacle retained supervision or 
control over Platinum. But beyond this inference, the record affirmatively establishes 
Pinnacle's supervision and control over Platinum. Specifically, Pinnacle reserved the right to 
inspect Platinum's work and to require correction of errors or defects. (Transcript at pages 
40, 43, 53, 92.) Under these circumstances, Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board 
reasonably concluded that Pinnacle was Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer. 
14 
As a final observation, the "statutory employer" provision found in §103(7) serves an 
important function in Utah's workers' compensation system. This important function was 
discussed by the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d at 431: 
According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to protect 
employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate 
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within 
his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and 
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." A 
secondary purpose of these statutes "was to forestall evasion of [workmen's 
compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their regular 
operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations 
with the workers . . . " (Citations in original omitted.) 
The dangers referenced in Bennett are all present in this case. Pinnacle tried to avoid 
workers' compensation responsibility by "subdividing [its] regular operations among 
subcontractors." And, in doing so, Pinnacle selected Platinum, an "irresponsible and 
uninsured subcontractor." Then, when Mr. Ebmeyer actually suffered serious injuries while 
working on Pinnacle's project, Pinnacle sought to shift the cost of those injuries from its own 
commercial enterprise and, through the UEF, to the responsible Utah employers who 
maintain workers' compensation coverage and who finance the UEF through premium 
assessments. Such a result would be contrary to the plain language of § 104(7) and the 
underlying policy of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Appeals Board correctly held Pinnacle to strict compliance with § 
104(4)'s "written notice" requirement. Pinnacle's failure to provide such written notice of its 
intention to exclude its officers as employees resulted in Pinnacle remaining subject to § 
104(7)'s statutory employer provision. The Appeals Board also reasonably concluded that 
the relationship between Pinnacle and Platinum satisfied § 103(7)'s requirement of 
15 
"supervision or control" so as to render Pinnacle liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' 
compensation benefits as his "statutory employer." Therefore, the Utah Labor Commission 
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Appeals Board's. 
Dated this 13th day of April, 2007. 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
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34A-2-103, Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed — 
Statutory employers, 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state are 
considered employers under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state is 
considered to be a single employer and includes any office, department, agency, 
authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other 
instrumentality of the state. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public utility 
and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or 
operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is considered an employer under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (2): 
(i) "Independent contractor11 means any person engaged in the performance of any 
work for another who, while so engaged, is: 
(A) independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work; 
(B) not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer; 
(C) engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work; and 
(D) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the 
employer's design. 
(ii) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, 
profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for 
only a portion of the year. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, 
Chapter 59, Professional Employer Organization Registration Act, is considered the 
employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation benefits for them 
by complying with Subsection 34A-2-201(l) or (2) and commission rules. 
(b) An insurance carrier may underwrite workers' compensation secured in accordance 
with Subsection (3)(a) showing the leasing company as the named insured and each client 
company as an additional insured by means of individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as directed by commission rule. 
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of Occupation and Professional 
Licensing within the Department of Commerce if the division has reason to believe that 
an employee leasing company is not in compliance with Subsection 34A-2-201(l) or (2) 
and commission rules. 
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more than one 
employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5): 
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person who employs agricultural labor as 
defined in Subsections 35A-4-206(l) and (2) and does not include employment as 
provided in Subsection 35A-4-206(3); and 
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A), only for purposes of determining who is 
a member of the employer's immediate family under Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) the rules of the commission. 
(7) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in 
part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision 
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the 
contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors under the 
contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered 
employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or remodelling a 
residence that the person owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's personal 
residence may not be considered an employee or employer solely by operation of 
Subsection (7)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship is not considered an 
employee under Subsection (7)(a) if the employer who procures work to be done by the 
partnership or sole proprietorship obtains and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole proprietorship's compliance with 
Section 34A-2-201 indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship secured the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a partner of 
the partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy 
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and 
(B) the partner or owner personally waives the partner's or owner's entitlement to the 
benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of 
the partnership or sole proprietorship. 
(d) A director or officer of a corporation is not considered an employee under 
Subsection (7)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 
34A-2-104(4). 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under Subsection 
(7)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontractor 
obtains and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 
34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a 
partner of the partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the sole proprietorship, 
a workers' compensation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-
104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and 
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner personally waives the partner's, corporate 
officer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's, corporation's, or sole 
proprietorship's enterprise under a contract of hire for services. 
(f) (i) For purposes of this Subsection (7)(f), "eligible employer" means a person who: 
34A-2-104. "Employee," "worker," and "operative" defined — Mining lessees 
and sublessees — Corporate officers and directors — Real estate agents and brokers -
- Prison inmates — Insurance producers — Certain domestic workers. 
(1) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, employee," 
"worker," and "operative" mean: 
(a) (i) each elective and appointive officer and any other person: 
(A) in the service of: 
(I) the state; 
(II) a county, city, or town within the state; or 
(III) a school district within the state; 
(B) serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under: 
(1) an election; 
(II) appointment; or 
(III) any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral; and 
(ii) including: 
(A) an officer or employee of the state institutions of learning; and 
(B) a member of the National Guard while on state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 34A-2-103, who 
employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about 
the same establishment: 
(i) under any contract of hire: 
(A) express or implied; and 
(B) oral or written; 
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working for hire; and 
(iii) not including any person whose employment: 
(A) is casual; and 
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of the employee's 
employer. 
(2) (a) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be: 
(i) covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter and Chapter 3; 
(ii) subject to this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(iii) entitled to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, to the same extent as if the 
lessee, employee, or sublessee were employees of the lessor drawing the wages paid 
employees for substantially similar work. 
(b) The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount 
equal to the insurance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include any partner of the 
partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole 
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an election under Subsection (3)(a), 
the partnership or sole proprietorship shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier 
naming the persons to be covered. 
(c) A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole proprietorship may not be considered 
an employee of the partner's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship under this 
individual that the individual is not an employee under this chapter or Chapter 3. 
(6) An individual described in Subsection (5)(d) may become an employee under this 
chapter and Chapter 3 if the employer of the individual complies with: 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(b) commission rules. 
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PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY 
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND; 
PINNACLE HOMES INC and/or 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 2003919 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on August 30,2004 at 11:29 AM. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. The Honorable Dale W Sessions, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
"ALJ") presided. The petitioner, Glen M Ebmeyer, was present and represented by his/her 
attorney Timothy Allen Esq. The Respondents Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley, was not present 
; and Pinnacle Homes Inc, and Uninsured Employers Fund were represented by attorney 
Theodore Kanell Esq, and Elliot R Lawrence Esq. 
Having failed to appear to defend the action following appropriate notice, default was 
entered on the record against Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley. 
THE ALJ having in mind the testimony and other evidence before it, now enters 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
in this matter as follows: 
V 
Petitioner was injured while he was working for Respondents Pinnacle Homes, 
Inc., Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley on August 11, 2003. 
Petitioner was acting in the scope and course of his employment at the time he 
was injured. He was roofing a home when a gust of wind swept him off of the 
roof. 
The nature of Petitioner's injuries include injury to both heels, wrist and elbow of 
the right hand/arm. 
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4. At the time of injury, Petitioner was earning $ 15-$ 18 per hour working 
approximately 40 hours per week, with an average weekly rate of $500.00. His 
compensation rate is $334.00 per week. 
5. At the time of the injury, Petitioner was not married and had no dependent 
children. 
6. Petitioner remained off work from the date of his injury to the present time. He 
claims temporary total disability for the maximum allowed period of time, to wit 
312 weeks. 
7. Petitioner has not yet reached stability or maximum medical improvement for his 
injuries. His disability has not yet been rated. 
8. Respondent is a statutory employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §34A-
2-103. Stated another way, because Petitioner was an employee of the sub-
contractor, he is a statutory employee of the general contractor in this instance. 
9. Respondents hired Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley to work for them on 
homes which they built to sell. The homes were not private residences of any 
principle of the Respondent Pinnacle Homes, Inc., but were built for the purpose 
of selling the completed homes for profit. 
10. Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was contracted to put a roof on a house in 
Saratoga Springs. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the general contractor. They sub-
contract to Platinum Home Builders. 
11. Petitioner was an employee of Platinum Builders and thereby a statutory 
employee of Pinnacle Homes, Inc. 
12. The Corporation of Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was established in 2002. The 
principles of the corporation have opted out of workers compensation coverage 
for themselves. This they are permitted to do under the law. However, they 
cannot escape the purposes and intent of the legislature in requiring that 
employees be covered for the injuries that they receive as a direct result of their 
employment. 
13. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., retained indirect control over the Petitioner. They alone 
decided who to hire as a sub-contractor on the specific homes within their 
business plan. Whether they exercised direct control over who the sub-contractor 
would hire is another matter. 
14. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether Platinum Builders and/or Mel 
Beagley is solvent or not. Therefore, the Uninsured Employers Fund faces the 
obligation to pay whatever Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley fails to pay, with 
their right to proceed in contribution from Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley 
intact. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is solvent, is an ongoing business and optimistic 
about the future of their business enterprise. 
15. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he did not sign the Master Service Agreement. His 
testimony is credible on that issue. His signature is not the same as on other 
documents in the Commission file including the Application for Hearing. 
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Further, it appears that someone attempted the signature on the wrong line, and 
then re-created the signature below the false start attempt at the signature 
16. Petitioner was able to work alone with Mel Beagley coming occasionally to see 
him at a job site. On occasion, a truck belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc., would 
drive through the area. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the owner of the house 
Petitioner was working on at the time he was injured. 
17. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., truck containing a person presumably from that company 
arrived once to ask if Petitioner was going to be fixing another home nearby. It is 
clear that Pinnacle Homes, Inc., had an expectation that Petitioner would be 
working on another project. 
18. Petitioner worked on 6 different homes belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc. 
19. Petitioner has not obtained an impairment rating and an opinion about 
stabilization because he cannot afford it. 
20. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is an ongoing and profitable business, presumable capable 
of paying some or all of the benefits awarded to Petitioner. 
21. Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is/are still in business, presumably in a 
profitable status and capable of paying some or all benefits awarded to Petitioner. 
The ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
in this matter as follows: 
22. Each person in the service of any employer who employs one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is an employee. 
Utah Code Ann §34A-2-104(l)(b). An operative is includes those persons that 
bring about the employers desired effect. 
23. In this case, Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was an operative of Pinnacle 
Homes, Inc. Testimony showed that it was a course and design of Pinnacle 
Homes Inc., to sub-contract work for their business enterprise. Petitioner worked 
on approximately 6 different homes for Pinnacle Homes, Inc. It appears that they 
may be seeking to avoid paying taxes, benefits and for maintaining workers 
compensation insurance on direct employees, so they use operatives instead. 
24. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is liable for the costs of injury because they are a statutory 
employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42(2) which states: 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
such contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under 
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him, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are 
considered employees of the original employer. 
25. Quoting in depth from Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1986): According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to 
protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing 
ultimate liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it 
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and 
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." Larson, supra, 
§ 49.14. A secondary purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of 
[workmen's compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their 
regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment 
relations with the workers " Id. § 49.15. 
Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of 
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or 
control over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor 
is a "part or process in the trade or business of the employer." E.g., Pinter 
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984); Rustler Lodge v. 
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318 (1975). 
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer," if it is part of the operations which directly relate to the successful 
performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise. Pinter 
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 
1128, 1131 (Utah 1977); King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30 A.2d 549, 
552 (1943). The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction 
business is construction, Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972); 
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 289, 508 P.2d 805, 807 
(1973); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1214,1223 (1944), and any portion of the general 
contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be 
considered "part or process in the trade or business o f the general contractor. 
The requirement in § 35-1-42(2) that the general contractor, as a "statutory 
employer," retain "supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor who 
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by {726 P.2d 432} definition, be equated 
with the common law standard for determining whether a person is an employee 
or an independent contractor. In dealing with "statutory" employees, the statute 
begins with the proposition that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the 
subcontractor. But the statutory requirement that the general contractor have 
"supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the 
subcontractor must also qualify as an employee of the general contractor. That 
would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather, 
the term "supervision or control" requires only that the general contractor retain 
ultimate control over the project. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 
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309. As stated mNochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 
944(1968), 
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to 
delegate to a greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor 
remains responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of 
necessity retains the right to require that subcontractors perform according to 
specifications. The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of 
subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain 
supervision or control over the subcontractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v. 
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See generally Tanner Companies v. Superior 
Court, 144 Ariz. 141,146, 696 P.2d 693,698 (1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting). 
Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general 
contractor's business, an inference arises that the general contractor has retained 
supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement of 
§ 35-1-42(2). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 316, 172 
P.2d 136,140(1946). 
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2) should be construed 
in favor of protecting the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 307; 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at 225, 364 P.2d at 
1022 (1961); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185,187-88, 290 P.2d 
692, 693-94 (1955). The Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an almost 
identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created scheme by 
which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the coverage of the 
[Workmen's Compensation] Act." Young v. Environmental Air Products, Inc., 136 
Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00. Wisconsin 
has also recognized the broad scope of its similar statute: 
The entire statutory scheme indicates a desire on the part of the legislature 
to extend the protection of these laws to those who might not be deemed 
employees {726 P.2d 433} under the legal concepts governing the liability of a 
master for the tortious acts of his servant. Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord, 
47 Wis. 2d 704, 715-16,177 N.W.2d 904, 910 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
26. In sum, it is well established that when an employer has retained the right to 
control the work of a worker's compensation claimant (such as select the sub-
contractor in the first place) the claimant is the employer's employee for workers 
compensation purposes. In determining whether the employee has retained the 
right of control the factors to consider include: the right to direct performance of 
the work, the right to hire and fire, responsibility for payment of wages and 
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providing necessary equipment. But these factors are not inclusive and one factor 
is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor Commission, 
967 P.2d 1258,1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately it is the right to control that is 
determinative. "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is 
determinative." Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246,249 (Utah 1995). 
27. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is the employer of Petitioner in this instance and should be 
liable for the injuries to Petitioner. 
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters the 
ORDER 
of the Labor Commission as follows: 
28. Respondent Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is hereby defaulted. 
29. Respondents Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley and Pinnacle Homes, Inc., are 
jointly and severally liable for the injuries, lost wages and medical costs of 
Petitioner as his employees). 
30. Jurisdiction over the Uninsured Employers Fund of Utah is reserved. 
31. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability payments of $334.00 per week 
from August 11,2003 until he is medically stable not to exceed 312 weeks. This 
amount is computed using $500 per week average weekly wage as stipulated at 
hearing. 
32. Petitioner is awarded compensation that includes payment of his medical bills that 
are reasonably related to his industrial injury. 
33. Petitioner is awarded 8% interest on payments due him in this order from the time 
they are accrued and/or due until paid in full. 
34. Petitioner's attorney, Timothy Allen, Esq., is awarded attorney fees established by 
the rules and sliding scale of the Labor Commission for meaningful services in this 
case. His fee is to be paid directly out of the award to Petitioner and paid to him 
directly. Likewise as each payment becomes due, a separate check will be sent to 
Mr. Allen for his fee. 
DATED March 24,2005. 
le WjSpssions 
AdministtSrve Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
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A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 24,2005, to the persons/parties at 
the following addresses: 
Glen M Ebmeyer 
330 N 800 W Apt 2 
Salt Lake City UT 84116 
Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley 
Box 1384 
RivertonUT 84065 
Pinnacle Homes Inc 
479 W 300 N 
American Fork UT 84003 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Timothy Allen Esq 
350 S 400 E N 113 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Theodore Kanell Esq 
136 ES Temple Ste 1700 
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Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Barry N Johnson Esq 
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Elliot R Lawrence Esq 
160E200S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLEN M. EBMEYER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PLATINUM BUILDERS, INC., 
PINNACLE HOMES, INC., and 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 03-0919 
Pinnacle Homes, Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review 
Administrative Law Judge Sessions' determination that Pinnacle shares liability with Platinum 
Builders, Inc. for Glen M. Ebmeyer's medical and disability benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
While working as a roofer for Platinum Builders, Inc.1 on August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer fell 
and suffered serious injuries. On September 19,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application to compel 
Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Ebmeyer 
added Pinnacle Homes, Inc. as a respondent in its capacity as the owner and builder of the house 
where the accident occurred. Mr. Ebmeyer also added the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") as a 
respondent because neither Platinum nor Pinnacle carried workers' compensation insurance.2 
Judge Sessions held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 24,2004. On March 24, 
2005, he awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum and Pinnacle jointly and severally 
liable for those benefits. Platinum was held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer. Pinnacle was 
held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to §34A-2-103(7) of the Act. 
i Judge Sessions' decision refers to "Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley." However, the record 
indicates that Platinum Builders was a Utah corporation in good standing at the time of Mr. 
Ebmeyer's work injury and that Mel Beagley was the corporation's owner. Under these facts, Mr. 
Ebmeyer's claim is against the corporation, rather than against Mr. Beagley as an individual. 
2 Pursuant to §34A-2-704 of the Act, the UEF assists in paying benefits to injured workers whose 
employers are insolvent, in receivership, or are otherwise unable to pay benefits. 
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In requesting review of Judge Sessions' decision, Pinnacle argues it does not meet § 34A-2-
103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer. Pinnacle also argues that, even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's 
statutory employer, Platinum remains primarily liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits and Pinnacle is 
only secondarily liable for those benefits. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board finds the following facts material to Pinnacle's motion for review. The 
Appeals Board also adopts Judge Sessions' findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this 
decision. 
Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of building and then selling new residential 
houses. The corporation consists of three individuals who are its officers and owners. Apart from 
these three officers, Pinnacle has no employees. It contracts with other companies and contractors to 
do the actual work necessary to build its houses. 
At the time Pinnacle started doing business, its insurance agent advised the company that it 
could exclude its officers/owners from workers' compensation coverage, in which case the company 
would have no employees and would not require workers' compensation insurance. Based on this 
advice, Pinnacle did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. However, Pinnacle did not 
submit written notice to its insurance carrier of its intent to exclude corporate officers from workers' 
compensation coverage. 
Platinum, also a Utah corporation at the time of Mr. Ebmeyer's accident, was in the business 
of installing roofs on houses. Pinnacle engaged Platinum to do the roofing on several houses 
Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs. Platinum in turn hired Mr. Ebmeyer to work as a roofer 
on one of those houses. Platinum did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. 
On August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer was completing the roof of the house in question when he 
accidentally fell and suffered the serious injuries. He now seeks workers' compensation benefits for 
those injuries. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to provide 
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured in work-related accidents. None of the parties 
challenge Judge Sessions' determination that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits for his injuries or Judge Sessions' determination that Platinum is liable for those benefits. 
However, Pinnacle argues that Judge Sessions erred in concluded that Pinnacle is also liable for 
those benefits as Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer under §103(7)(a) of the Act. The material 
provisions of §103(7)(a) are as follows: 
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
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the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or 
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the 
contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor... are considered employees 
of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter.. . . 
Pinnacle argues that because it had no employees, it was not an employer. Consequently, it 
falls outside the scope of §103(7)(a), which is specifically limited to those entities who are 
employers. The Appeals Board agrees that §103(7)(a) applies only to employers. Under the 
circumstances of this case, Pinnacle's status as an employer depends on whether its corporate 
officers are employees for purposes of the workers' compensation system. 
Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as " . . . each person... who regularly 
employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business... under any contract of hire — " 
Section 104(4)(c) of the Act specifically provides that "[a] director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee . . . until the notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given." 
The notice requirements of §104(4)(b) are as follows (emphasis added): "If a corporation 
makes an election under Subsection (4)(a) [to exclude a corporate officer or director as an 
employee], the corporation shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage." 
Consequently, unless Pinnacle complied with the notice requirements of §104(4)(b), its 
officers must be considered employees and Pinnacle must be considered an employer. Furthermore, 
corporations must strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and 
directors from coverage. In Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.3d 257 (Utah 1998), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered an earlier version of §104(4)(b). The Court stated: 
This court construes workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of 
finding employee coverage. In Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 
1990), we stated, "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the 
Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when 
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction." Allowing exclusion of 
a director from coverage on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the 
Workers' Compensation Act liberally against coverage. This we will not do. We 
find that constructive notice is not a substitute for the written notice required by 
section 35-l-43(3)(b). 
In order to exclude its corporate officers as "employees," §104(4)(b) required Pinnacle to 
serve its insurance carrier with a written notice naming the persons to be excluded. Pinnacle did not 
3 In the context of § 104(4)(b) specifically and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this 
reference to "insurance carrier" must be understood as referring to the employer's workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, and not to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage. 
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provide such notice. Consequently, Pinnacle's officers remained employees and, for that reason, 
Pinnacle remained an employer. As an employer, Pinnacle is subject to the statutory employer 
provisions of §103(7) and is liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits. 
Pinnacle argues that even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer, its liability for his 
benefits is secondary to Platinum's liability. Pinnacle's argument continues that Mr. Ebmeyer must 
first seek his benefits from Platinum before he can compel Pinnacle to pay any benefits. Pinnacle 
does not cite any authority for this argument, which runs contrary to the plain language of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. As already noted, both Platinum and Pinnacle are Mr. Ebmeyer's 
employers and, as such, they are each liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits. While it may be true that 
Pinnacle may obtain reimbursement from Platinum for any benefits Pinnacle pays, Mr. Ebmeyer is 
entitled to obtain payment from either or both of his two employers. 
ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Sessions' decision and denies 
Pinnacle's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance upon Section 
34A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees, within the meaning of § 104(4), are 
directors and officers. By enacting this section, the Utah Legislature has clearly established the 
public policy that certain limited, corporate employees may be exempt from workers' compensation 
coverage. However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to comply with 
the notice requirements of § 104(4)(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance carrier to notify, in writing, 
of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its officers and directors from coverage and as "employees' under the 
Act. The majority's decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle; 
they could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance carrier which 
essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but we do not need workers' 
compensation coverage because we are electing to exempt all our officers and directors, which are 
our only employees, from coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to 
being "employers" under §103(7)(a). 
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Instead, I believe that facts in this case support the conclusion that Pinnacle acted as a general 
contractor with sufficient supervisor control that the subcontractors became employees of Pinnacle 
and Pinnacle is therefore an "employer" pursuant to §103(7)(a). Had Pinnacle desired to insulate 
itself from workers' compensation liability under the Act, it could have retained an independent 
general contractor which had appropriate workers' compensation insurance coverage. 
JosJfm E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Glen 
M. Ebmeyer, Case No. 03-0919, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ffaay ofJ«ry720p6, to 
the following: duouM 
Glen M. Ebmeyer 
330 N 800 W Apt 12 




Pinnacle Homes Inc 
479 W 300 N 
American Fork UT 84003 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Timothy Allen, Esq. 
350 S 400 E N 113 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Theodore Kanell, Esq. 
136 E S Temple Ste 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Barry N Johnson, Esq. 
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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employees ? 
A. No . 
Q. Does Pinnacle Homes ever actually do 
any of the physical work on any of the homes that 
it owns? 
A. No . 
Q. Okay. How is it that you people get 
paid then? 
A. We take a draw against profits and — and 
then have a reconciliation at the end of the 
year . 
Q. When you first organized this business, 
did you attempt to obtain all the insurance 
coverage that you needed? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How did you do that? 
A. I went to the office of our insurance 
agent, Wendy Dean Marshall, I believe is her name, 
and told her what Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc., was 
going to do, told her about the organizational 
structure and asked her to provide us with the 
insurance coverages that we needed. 
Q. Did she make any queries as to whether 
or not Pinnacle Homes had any employees? 
A . S h e d i d . 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
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Q. And what did you tell her? 
A. I told her that we did not have 
employees. 
Q. And did you file applications as such 
with her ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she then tell you what type of 
insurances you needed? 
A. She did. She~-she said that we would 
need general liability insurance, insurance on 
our--on a little office space that we rent, and--
and she told us--on the workers compensation, she 
said that since we were all owners of the 
corporation that we would not--we would not be 
required to purchase workers compensation 
insurance; we could opt out of it. 
Q. And did you in fact opt out of it? 
A. I told Wendy that we wanted to opt out. 
Q. Okay. And so did you--did you obtain 
insurance for this business? 
A. We did. 
Q. And once you received notice that this 
application was filed, did you turn that over to 
them? 
A . Y e s . 
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Q. And what did they tell you? 
A. They told us that it was the general 
liability insurance that was submitted to, and 
they told us that they — that we were not covered 
under that policy for workers compensation. 
Q. And why? Did they tell you why? 
Because you didn't have any employees? 
A. We didn't have any employees. 
Q. Okay. Now, when you make payments to 
Mr. Beagley, you heard the testimony of 
Mr. Lawrence about-~just about getting an invoice 
and making a payment. Is that how it works? 
A. That's how it works. 
Q. Okay. Are you aware of anybody in your 
business, you, Skip or Scott, who has ever had 
any control or give any direction to Mr. Beagley 
about how work was to be done on any of these 
homes ? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Okay. Now, the judge, you heard him 
question Mr. Lawrence about inspecting these 
things and, after the job is done, did anybody 
even inspect their work? 
A. Before I pay an invoice, I--if the work 
is done, I pay the invoice. 
* 
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No questions, Your Honor. 
Q. Okay. Do you leave the inspections up 
to the cities or their inspections of codes and 
whatever they want to inspect? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. KANELL: That's all the questions I 
have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Allen? 
MR. ALLEN 
THE COURT: All right. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY-MR.LAWRENCE: 
Q. Mr. Lawrence--you'11 have to remind me 
o f your name. 
A. Liljenquist, Brad. 
Q. Mr. Liljenquist, you probably heard the 
same line of questioning that I gave Mr. Lawrence 
regarding the financial status of your company. 
Are you familiar and competent to testify on the 
current financial status--
A. I be 1ieve so. 
Q. --of Pinnacle Homes? And I believe 
earlier we were--I think the number forty thousand 
was floating around. Is your company solvent and 
would it be capable of paying a claim of forty--
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